UMCLASSING ENCLOSES OF CLASSING ALACTMAN

January 2, 1981

STAT

CIA Historian 203 Key Building Washington, D.C. 20505

STAT

Dear

Dr. Jack Holl, Chief Historian, Department of Energy, has requested a copy of the following CIA classified document for use in preparing an unclassified history of the Atomic Energy Commission:

Memorandum, Herbert Scoville, to Director, Central Intelligence, May 11, 1957, (2 pp.) SECRET

We have, therefore, transmitted a copy of this memorandum to your office for review and release to Historian's Office, Department of Energy. You may communicate directly with Dr. Holl regarding this item. Please inform the Eisenhower Library of the action taken by the CIA on this document.

Sincerely,

MARTIN M. TEASLEY

Acting Director

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library



11 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT : Effectiveness of Nuclear Test Detection System

- 1. This memorandum is for information only.
- 2. The present nuclear test detection system has a very high probability of detecting atomic tests with yields are after than 20 KT as long as the detenation occurs on or hear the surface of the earth. As the yield is decreased below 20 KT, the certainty of detection falls off. The lowest yield Soviet test detected to date was about 3 KT. The probability of detecting shots with yields less than 1 KT is quite small.
- 3. If the height of burst is increased to altitudes above about 30,000 feet, the probability of collecting a sample of radioactive debris falls off so that at these high altitudes it might be difficult to prove that the explosion picked up by the accustic system was really a nuclear test. For burst altitudes of 100,000 feet or greater, it is presently uncertain whether any acoustic signal will be detected. This point is scheduled to be checked in the next U. S. series of tests in the Pacific. However, for any nation to conduct a weapons development program by tests at these extreme altitudes is very unlikely.
- 4. At the present time, the United States detection system is aimed at tests within the USSR and therefore might have loopholes for detecting tests in the Southern Hemisphere. However, we believe that conventional intelligence would probably give an indication of any Soviet tests in these areas.
- Some of the confusion as to the effectiveness of the test detection system has resulted from the statement in the Permuda Communique that "a test limitation agreement could not be effectively enforced for technical reasons nor could breaches of it be surely detected". This statement referred to the specific test limitation being discussed at that meeting; i.e., a test limitation on the numbers of megatons of fission products which could be released annually. Because of the great difficulty in measuring accurately the total fission products in the atmosphere, it is cuite true that the violation of such a test limitation could not be proven.



1	NO CHANGE IN CLASS
of West Brandston	CM CONTRACTOR
TS S C 🥆	AND CHARLES TO
	ENTERENT MENTAL CONTRACTOR
	pare 165 on 81 me



SUBJECT: Effectiveness of Nuclear Test Detection System

Unfortunately the Bermuda statement has been rather broadly used without an understanding of the limited situation to which it applied.

6. In summary, I believe that we are reasonably certain of detecting all Soviet tests greater than 20 KT. On the other hand, I believe that the Soviets can not, with any reasonable degree of assurance, conduct a covert nuclear test of yield greater than a few KT.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence



7 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CRD

FROM : CIA History Staff

SUBJECT : Request for declassification of

May 11, 1957 memo from Herbert Scoville, Jr., to Director, CIA;

(attached)

The attached letter from the Acting Director of the Eisenhower Library and related documents are being forwarded to your office for declassification review. We request that, if possible the memo be declassified for use in the AEC unclassified history.

Following a decision by your officers to either retain or leave the classification of the document in question, the History Staff will notify the requestor of your ruling.

We would appreciate having your decision by 30 January, 1981.

CIA History Staff 203 Key Bldg.

Encs: a/s

Dist:

O-Addressee w/att 1-HS Chrono

SECRET

STAT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/20 : CIA-RDP01-00569R000100020059-6

16 January 1981

	MEMORANDUM FOR:	CIA History Staff	
STAT	ATTENTION:		
STAT	FROM:		
		CRD, Intelligence Branch	
	SUBJECT:	Request for Declassification of May 11, 1957 Memo from Herbert Scoville, Jr., to Director, CIA	
	Upon examin	nation by this reviewer and OSWR/NED officials, we are	
	pleased to tell y	ased to tell you that the decision was reached to declassify the subject	
	document. You ma	ay proceed to notify the requestor of this decision.	
STAT			

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 January 1981

Dr. Jack Holl Chief Historian Department of Energy Room 7G033 Forrestal Building Washington, DC 20585

Dear Dr. Holl:

The CIA Historical Staff received a letter dated 2 January 1981, from the Acting Director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Martin M. Teasley, requesting our review for release of the attached CIA originiated document: Memorandum, Herbert Scoville, to Director, Central Intelligence, May 11, 1957, (2 pp.) SECRET, sub: Effectiveness of Nuclear Test Detection System.

The attached memorandum has been declassified for your use in preparing an unclassified history of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Attached for your information is CIA's Access Policy Concerning Presidential Libraries (revised 12 July 1977). The usual caveats concerning CIA review prior to declassification, downgrading, or publication of material from CIA originated documents in any UNCLASSIFIED publication apply.

A copy of this communication has been sent to Martin M. Teasley, Acting Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, and to Mr. R. A. Jacobs, Acting Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries, NARS.

Sincerely yours,

STAT

Distribution:

O-Addressee w/att

1-Ben Evans, 7E13 Hqs

1-HS Chrono

2-File

1-M.M. Teasley, DDE. Lib

1-R A Jacobs NARS

Dr. Roberta S. Knapp Acting Chief, Historical Staff 203 Key Building Washington, DC 20505

Attachments: As stated

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 January 1981

Martin M. Teasley
Acting Director
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Abilene, Kansas 67410

Dear Mr. Teasley:

The attached copy of my letter to Dr. Jack Holl, Chief Historian, Department of Energy is in response to your request of 2 January 1981, to the CIA Historian asking for review and release to Dr. Holl of the CIA originated document enclosed with your letter.

The document in question is: Memorandum, Herbert Scoville, to Director, Central Intelligence, May 11, 1957, (2 pp.) SECRET, sub: Effectiveness of Nuclear Test Detection System. It has been downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by the appropriate CIA component for 'Dr. Holl's use in preparing an unclassified history of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Classified Document Accountability Record Sheet from your library has been signed and attached.

Sincerely yours,

STAT

Distribution:
0-Addressee w/att
1-Ben Evans, 7E13 Hqs
1-HS Chrono
2-File

Attachements:
As stated

Dr. Roberta S. Knapp Acting Chief, Historical Staff 203 Key Building Washington, DC 20505

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 January 1981

Mr. Richard A. Jacobs Acting Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries National Archives & Records Service Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Jacobs:

Forwarded for your information is a copy of my letter to Martin M. Teasley, Acting Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, concerning disposition of a CIA originated document from that library requested by Dr. Jack Holl, Chief Historian, Department of Energy, for his use in an unclassified history of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

STAT

Distribution:
0-Addressee w/att
1-Ben Evans, 7E13 Hqs
1-HS Chrono
2-File

Dr. Roberta S. Knapp Acting Chief, Historical Staff 203 Key Building Washington, DC 20505

Attachment: As stated